A "stalling" economy has been defined as one that experiences a discrete deterioration in economic performance following a decline in its growth rate to below some threshold level. Previous efforts to identify stalls have focused primarily on the US economy, with the threshold level being chosen endogenously. Using this approach on a panel of 51 economies, we find that about half show signs of statistically significant stalls, including a broad crosssection of both advanced and emerging market economies. However, this approach is biased towards finding evidence of stalling, regardless of underlying business cycle dynamics. Correcting for this bias using a sieve bootstrap, we find much less evidence of stalling outside of the US economy.
Introduction
Recently, some market analysts and central bank researchers have suggested that economies, like aircraft, stall. While different precise definitions of macroeconomic stalling have been considered, the central idea is that a slow rate of economic growth will tend to be followed by a discrete deterioration in economic performance. In one form of the stalling hypothesis, such a slowdown will lead to a recession. If economies stall, this characteristic would be helpful for modelling and forecasting macroeconomic growth.
For example, Nalewaik (2011) models a stalling economy as one in which the growth rate is too low to sustain normal growth and therefore slips into recession. He illustrated the quantitative value of including a low-growth state consistent with this in a Markov switching model of the US economy. He found that hitting the low-growth state significantly increased the likelihood of entering the recession state in the following period, although this appears to be sensitive to how GDP growth is defined and the inclusion of additional variables in the empirical model. 2 Sheets (2011) and Sheets and Sorkin (2012) [hereafter Sheets] considered an alternative definition of stalling defined as a decline in a year-on-year growth rate of real GDP to below some threshold. They show that, thus defined, stalling appears to play an important role in predicting a future slowdown, not just in the United States, but in other economies as well, based on graphical analysis and regression results. Ho and Yetman (2012) considered both these definitions of stalling in US GDP data using kernel density estimates, probit estimates and Markov switching models. They found that, if a stall is defined as a low but positive growth rate in the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of real GDP, as in Nalewaik (2011) , there is no evidence of stalling in US GDP data. In contrast, if a stall is defined as a decline in the year-on-year growth rate of the economy to below some threshold, as in Sheets, then stalling appears to significantly increase the likelihood of a future recession.
There are two important differences between these tests for stalling. First, the way in which a stall is defined -quarter-on-quarter growth versus year-on-year growth at quarterly frequency -turns out to be important to the US results. Below, we will illustrate how evidence of stalling is greater based on year-on-year growth rates than quarter-on-quarter growth rates.
Second is the way in which the different definitions select different episodes as potential "stalls". Real GDP growth rates are persistent, and have a tendency to mean-revert. As a result, low growth periods generally occur at two points during the business cycle: i) shortly before the economy enters a recession and ii) as the economy exits a recession. If one defines stalling as simply "experiencing a low level of growth", as in Nalewaik (2011) , both types of low-growth episodes are considered together: those that tend to be followed by higher growth, and those that tend to be followed by recessions. In contrast, if one only considers low growth episodes that occur when the economy is slowing down, as in Sheets, this will tend to single out episodes that precede recessions. Thus it is not surprising that the latter definition of stalling will generally result in greater evidence of stalling than the former.
But there is a potential problem with looking for evidence of stalling. Stalling in macroeconomics is an empirical concept, and it is not clear ex ante which level of growth 2 In a model based on quarter-on-quarter growth rates, as in Nalewaik (2011) , stalling is evident when both GDI and GDP growth are included, but not when GDP growth is considered alone (see Ho and Yetman (2012) for a discussion).
should be identified with stalling. One tempting approach is to examine the data and then choose the stall speed that appears to fit best, based either on casual empiricism or formal estimation. However, then the resulting empirical results regarding the importance of stalling may be misleading: the threshold that fits the data best is highly correlated (or identical, depending on the selection criteria used) to the threshold that has the most significant test statistic. Subsequent tests of the importance of stalling are then biased towards demonstrating a statistically significant role, irrespective of the true underlying relationship between low growth rates and future slowdowns in the macroeconomy. 3 Here, we examine the evidence for stalling in a panel of 51 economies. We define a stall as a decline in the growth rate of the economy, to below some threshold level, as in Sheets. We first consider a wide range of possible growth rates as stall thresholds, in steps of 0.01, and select the one for which there is the greatest empirical evidence. Our initial results indicate widespread evidence for stalling: in 22 (out of 51) economies, we find that stalling is a statistically significant phenomenon at the 5% level, based on standard critical values.
We then adjust for the bias that is inherent in considering multiple stall levels using a careful bootstrap exercise. Resampling the data using a sieve bootstrap based on a data generating process that, by construction, does not include a role for stalling, we calculate corrected pvalues. We find that the evidence for stalling is then much weaker. Instead of 22 economies, only 7 stall at the 5% level. And whereas the original 22 included a broad cross-section of advanced and emerging market economies, the remaining 7 stallers are the US along with some predominantly emerging market economies (Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan and Venezuela).
We then show that bias is still a major problem if we restrict ourselves to considering only a small number of possible stall levels. Using a step size of 0.5, as in Sheets, instead of 0.01, 21 (out of 51) economies experience statistically significant stalls at the 5% level based on standard critical values, but less than half that number based on bootstrapped critical values. In contrast, if we consider only one, exogenously chosen, stall threshold, there is little evidence of stalling for most economies, and little discrepancy between the standard critical values and those generated by our bootstrap.
In the next section, we outline the intuition for our arguments based on kernel density estimates using US data. We then provide our own empirical results for the statistical significance of stalls, based on standard critical values, in section 2. Next we conduct a bootstrap exercise to correct for bias, before concluding.
Stalling: the intuitive evidence
To illustrate the idea of stalling, we first provide some simple, graphical evidence based on kernel density forecasts on US data. Figure 1 displays four graphs based on different definitions of stalling. Each graph contains two kernel density estimates, 4 one based on observations 1-4 periods following a "stall", and one based on all other observations. In the left-hand graphs the classification of stalling is based on the Nalewaik (2011): real GDP growing at 0-1%. In the right-hand panels, it is based on Sheets: real GDP growth slowing from above 1.5% to between 0 and 1.5%. Vertically, in the top row a stall is based on 3 This may be thought of variously as a form of selection bias, pre-test bias or data mining. 4 These estimates are based on the Epanechnikov kernel and the default bandwidth setting in Stata.
quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates (annualised), as in Nalewaik (2011), and the bottom row on year-on-year growth rates at quarterly frequency, as in Sheets. 5 Comparing the four panels, there is little evidence of stalling, and little difference between the two measures, based on quarter-on-quarter growth (top row). However, based on year-onyear growth there is considerable evidence of stalling, and more so using the Sheets definition (right-hand-lower) than the Nalewaik definition (left-hand-lower): the difference in mean growth rates in the four quarters following a stall versus no stall is 2.17% using the Nalewaik (2011) In what follows, we will focus on the case presented here with the greatest evidence of stalling: the Sheets definition of a stall, based on year-on-year growth rates in real GDP. This offers the added advantage that we are using data for a large number of economies, drawn from national sources, and methods of seasonal adjustment likely vary. The year-on-year change in quarterly real GDP growth rates is relatively robust to seasonal adjustment methods, and increases the comparability of our results across economies.
We will answer the following questions: is stalling a common characteristic across economies? And is it a statistically important phenomenon?
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In Sheets, a stall is defined in terms of year-on-year growth rates but the variable being explained by a stall is quarter-on-quarter growth rates (annualised). Here we use year-on-year growth rates for both variables. 
Empirical evidence of stalling
Our sample is real GDP drawn from publically available national sources. We include a large panel of advanced and emerging market economies for which we can obtain at least 10 years of data, and construct year-on-year real GDP growth, at quarterly frequency. The full sample, along with summary statistics, is given in Table 1 , in order of two-digit economy codes.
To estimate a model of stalling for each economy in our sample, we take the following steps:
1. Regress the year-on-year growth rate of real GDP, t y , on up to four lags, selecting the number of lags L using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 2. Consider every possible stall threshold level between zero and the mean growth rate in steps of 0.01. Then, at each possible stall level:
a. Construct a stall dummy t D that takes the value 1 if growth passed from above the stall level to below the stall level in period t , and 0 otherwise b. Regress the growth rate on a constant, the number of lags determined by the AIC in step 1, and four lags of the stall dummy, as in We impose one additional restriction when selecting stall levels. Since we are interested in identifying a regularity in the data that is useful for modelling and forecasting growth, we restrict ourselves to stall levels that are triggered at least three times over the sample period. The results from applying this process across all the economies in our sample are given in Table 2 . indication of significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. The results suggest that 31 of the 51 economies in our sample have statistically significant stalls at the 10% level, 22 at the 5% level and 12 at the 1% level. At face value, these results suggest that stalling is a common characteristic across economies, and may be a useful concept for modelling and forecasting GDP growth.
Bootstrap correction
One problem with the results outlined in the above section is that the statistical significance of the results was assessed in terms of standard critical values. These ignore the fact that many possible stall thresholds have been considered, and the choice of threshold is not independent of the size of the subsequent test statistic regarding the empirical importance of stalling. Hence the hypothesis tests are biased towards finding significant evidence of stalling, regardless of the underlying behaviour of real GDP over the business cycle.
To correct for this, we construct a sieve bootstrap, as outlined in MacKinnon (2006) . This is a semi-parametric bootstrap that is intended to approximate dependent data well. We take the estimated residuals from the estimated GDP process without the stall dummies (see step 1 in the last section; the null model hereafter) and fit them with an auto-regressive process, as follows: We construct 1000 such artificial samples for each economy and then repeat the same estimation process outlined in section 2 on each sample. We then determine the proportion of test statistics in our artificial samples that are larger than we obtained in our data. For every such test statistic across our artificial sample, the p-value from our bootstrap exercise increases (from zero) by 0.001.
The p-values based on both standard critical values and the bootstraps are contained in the left-hand columns of table 3. These are colour-coded: yellow indicates significance at the 10% level, orange at the 5% and red at the 1%.
The bootstrap exercise indicates that there are many fewer statistically significant stalls than the standard critical values would suggest. Instead of 31 economies with statistically significant stalls at the 10% level, there are 13. At the 5% level of significance, 22 drops to 7. And at the 1% level, the number of economies with statistically significant stalls falls from 11 to 3 or 4, depending on the number of lags used in the autoregressive representation of the residuals in the bootstrap.
Another important difference is a change in the composition of the countries that experience statistically significant stalls. Whereas a wide cross-section of economies appear to stall based on standard critical values, with the exception of the US emerging market economies dominate the significant stallers that emerge from the bootstrap exercise. To deal with the initial value problem, we generate much longer series than we require to replicate our sample and then discard all except the final n observations.
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The full set of economies that exhibit statistically significant stalls at the 5% level based on our bootstrap results are Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan and the United States. One possible explanation for the differences in results between the bootstrap and standard critical values is bias due to the endogenous choice of stall thresholds. Because we are considering a wide range of possible threshold levels, and selecting the one that has the greatest empirical support, we are likely to find evidence consistent with stalling whether it is an important factor in explaining business cycle dynamics or not. To explore this possibility, we consider three alternative estimation strategies that reduce the number of possible stall levels considered. First, we consider all possible stall levels between zero and the mean growth rate, but in steps of 0.5 instead of 0.01, reducing the number of stall levels by a factor of around 50. 8 And we also examine two possibilities of a single, exogenous, stall threshold: the mid-point between zero and the mean growth rate, and 1% growth. These final two examples should in principle display little such bias. 9 For each of these estimation strategies, we repeat both the estimation and the bootstrap exercise.
The results are contained in table 3 above. Using steps of 0.5, there is only a slight decline in the discrepancy between the asymptotic critical values and the bootstrap results from those obtained using steps of 0.01. Thus, even considering larger step-sizes does not materially address the bias that exists in tests of stalling. In contrast, examining just a single stall level largely eliminates the discrepancy in that there are only relatively small differences between the sets of columns on the right half of table 3.
10 Table 4 outlines the results another way, displaying the number of statistically significant results across each of the estimation methods, based on both standard critical values and bootstrap results, for a range of significance levels. These results reinforce the view that there is little discrepancy between the asymptotic critical values and the bootstrap results when only one possible stall level is examined. In contrast, when multiple possible stall levels are examined, then there is considerable bias. 
Conclusions
A "stalling" economy has been defined as one that experiences a discrete deterioration in economic performance if its growth rate slows to below some threshold value. Conceptually, the idea of a stall would be very useful for modelling and forecasting purposes, but lacks a theoretical foundation, or any basis on which to determine the growth rate at which the economy stalls, ex ante. One approach is thus to consider a range of possible stall thresholds, and select the one for which there is the greatest empirical support. Here we show that such an approach is likely to leave the researcher with the impression that a) a stall speed model fits many economies well and b) stalling is a statistically significant phenomenon. However, correcting for the pre-test bias that is inherent in this approach, we find little evidence of stalling. Out of a panel of 51 economies, only 7 experience statistically significant stalls at the 5% critical level, based on a careful bootstrap exercise, compared with 22 based on standard critical values. Stalling economies are not common.
